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Abstract
Between 1996 and 2003, a series of amendments were made to the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 that gradually increased the tax deduction for health insurance purchases by the
self-employed from 25 to 100 percent. We study how these changes have in
uenced the
likelihood that a self-employed person has health insurance coverage as the policy holder.
The Current Population Survey is used to construct a data set corresponding to 1995-2005.
Both the dierence-in-dierence and price elasticity of demand estimates suggest that the
series of tax deductions did not provide sucient incentives for the self-employed to obtain
health insurance coverage.
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In his 2007 State of the Union address, President Bush is quoted as saying, \Changing
the tax code is a vital and necessary step to making health care aordable for more Americans."
The President is proposing a set of standard tax deductions to help the more than 45 million
Americans who are without coverage. This amounts to nearly 18 percent of the non-elderly
population (ages 64 and under). His proposed tax deductions are intended to \level the playing
eld for those who do not get health insurance through their job" and to help \put a basic
private health insurance plan within reach" for the millions of Americans lacking coverage.
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF, 2005) in 2004, the overwhelming majority
(61 percent) of non-elderly Americans received their health insurance through their employers;
individuals working in midsize/large rms (200+ employees) were oered health insurance 98
percent of the time whereas 59 percent of individuals working in small rms (3-199 employees)
were oered coverage. About half (51 percent) of these employer-based plans covered only
the worker and the remaining 49 percent covered the employee's dependents (e.g., spouse)
as well. Only ve percent of Americans have health insurance through a private non-group
plan; the remaining 16 percent are covered by public programs (e.g., Medicaid). Those who
lack health insurance often include low income persons, single mothers and their children, and
self-employed individuals.
This paper seeks to address the question: Can we x the health insurance problem with
tax incentives? We investigate this question by examining a series of amendments made to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). The TRA86 granted self-employed persons the ability to
deduct 25 percent of their health insurance premiums (i.e. own, spouse, and dependents) from
their taxable income. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 established a schedule
that would gradually increase this deduction to 80 percent by 2007. Since then, the schedule
has been accelerated twice with passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the Tax and
Trade Extension Relief Act of 1998. Through these series of amendments, the initial TRA86
tax deduction was increased to 30, 40, 45, 60, 70, and 100 percent in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
2002, and 2003, respectively. Prior to this, the self-employed, who did not itemize their income
tax deductions, paid for their health insurance with after-tax dollars. We use data from the
1996-2006 March Supplements of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to analyze the eect
1of these amendments in the tax code for the period corresponding to 1995-2005. Specically,
we examine how changes in the tax code, concerning the deductibility of health insurance
premiums by the self-employed, have aected whether an individual has coverage as a policy
holder.
The most notable paper addressing the issues surrounding the initial tax reform is Gruber
and Poterba (1994), hereafter G&P94. They examine the original TRA86 with respect to the
price elasticity of demand for health insurance coverage. They argue that if the price elasticities
are negligible, then providing tax subsidies may not necessarily lead to signicant improvements
in coverage rates. Using data from the 1986-1987 and 1989-1990 CPS, they analyze the decision
of the self-employed to purchase health insurance before and after the initial 25 percent tax
deduction. Using a dierence-in-dierence (DD) model, they compare wage/salary employees
and self-employed people and show that the subsidy increased the demand for health insurance
among the latter, with marginal statistical signicance. They also show that the estimated
eect of the policy depends on the individual's marginal tax rate (MTR), i.e. the tax deduction
is more valuable for single individuals at higher MTRs. Heim and Lurie (2007) consider the
amendments made to the TRA86 between 1999 and 2003 using data from the 1999 Edited
Panel of Tax Returns. They nd a very small but statistically signicant eect of the tax
policy. By comparison, we focus on estimating the eects of the entire series of amendments
made to the TRA86 using the 11 most recent years of CPS data.
The time frame we consider is not only longer than that analyzed by G&P94 but it also
provides a cleaner \natural experiment." Their analysis is complicated by other changes that
accompanied the TRA86; the MTRs and medical care expenditure deduction rules and rates
were also altered during the same time period they consider.1 Following G&P94's strategy, we
take a two-fold approach in analyzing the eect of the amendments. We rst use a DD model
where we study whether self-employed persons were more likely to purchase health insurance
as a policy holder, relative to wage/salary employees, over time as the TRA86 amendments
provided increasingly generous tax deductibility. Second, we estimate the price elasticity of
health insurance demand for various groups. Due to data limitations, G&P94 cannot distin-
guish between private health insurance coverage in one's own name and that in someone else's
name (such as a spouse) and we show that this leads to somewhat in
ated estimates of elas-
1During the period we consider the MTRs were altered only in 2002, but the impact was very limited.
2ticity. The empirical analysis is performed for prime-age (ages 25-60) workers, both male and
female. Overall, we nd very small estimates of the price semi-elasticity of demand. Single
persons and individuals without children tend to have the most elastic demand. A one percent
decrease in the health insurance premium increases the likelihood that a self-employed single
man (woman) has coverage in his (her) own name by 0.69 (1.01) percentage points. Based on
the average rate of coverage for self-employed single men (women), 40.6 (44.5) percent, these
gures indicate a rather small eect. These gures, taken together with the DD estimates,
provide no evidence that the increased generosity of the TRA86 tax deductions were able to
oset the rate of growth in the premiums to help close or reduce the gap in health insurance
coverage between the self-employed and wage/salary workers. This nding is consistent with
others in the literature.
Eorts directed at using tax policy to solve the uninsurance problem include Marquis
and Long (1995), Gruber (2005), and Holtz-Eakin (2005). In their attempts to quantify the
eect of tax subsidies on the number of uninsured persons, Marquis and Long (1995) and
Holtz-Eakin (2005) estimate the price elasticity of demand for working families/individuals.
Note that these exercises are limited by the availability of reliable price measures in the private
non-group market. Marquis and Long (1995) use data from the 1988 March CPS and the
1987 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Their policy simulations suggest
that even a tax subsidy that reduces the after-tax premium by 40 percent would increase the
number of families purchasing non-group health insurance by no more than eight percentage
points. More recently, Holtz-Eakin (2005) estimates the price elasticity of demand using data
from the 2001 SIPP. He also nds a very limited response: for example, a 50 percent tax subsidy
increases the individual demand by 3.5 percentage points. While the elasticity estimates dier
somewhat, both studies conclude that even sizeable tax subsidies to the working uninsured will
generate only a limited response in the non-group market. Finkelstein (2002) estimates the
price elasticity of demand for supplementary health insurance in Canada. She analyzes a tax
subsidy for employer-provided health insurance and estimates an elasticity of -0.5 while the
demand for non-group supplementary health insurance seems to be even less price responsive.
Finally, Gruber (2005) uses a microsimulation model for the U.S. to compare the eciency
implications of various policies proposed to remedy the uninsurance problem. He nds that
the ineciencies associated with tax credits are greater than those stemming from a possible
3expansion of public insurance.
Other papers in the literature have addressed the strong connection between the labor
market and health insurance coverage. Thomasson (2002, 2003) provides an excellent history
of the evolution of the American health insurance market highlighting the 1942 Stabilization
Act and the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. Together these laws enabled employers to deduct
their contributions to their employees' health insurance plans from their payroll taxes. This has
led to the strong link between wage/salary employment and health insurance coverage. The
coupling of health insurance and employment has arisen not only because of the nature of the
tax system but also because: 1) the administrative costs are lowered when selling insurance to
rms; 2) moral hazard concerns are eased with the provision of benets in the form of services,
as opposed to cash indemnities; and 3) the pooling of risk across employees alleviates problems
associated with adverse selection. Gruber and Madrian (2004) and Madrian (2006) provide
extensive reviews of the recent literature on the relationship between health insurance and
employment.
One of the primary concerns with this link is that it limits job turnover which may in turn
aect worker productivity and ultimately impact economic growth. Madrian (1994) and Gruber
and Madrian (1994) nd such evidence of \job-lock." By comparison, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996)
and Gilleskie and Lutz (2002) nd no signicant relationship between employer-provided health
insurance and job turnover. And yet others have found that the impact varies by empirical
specication or the group analyzed (e.g., Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996). Gruber and Madrian
(1994, 1997) nd that the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985
aects job turnover and increases the rate of transition from employment to not being in the
labor force. The COBRA requires employers, who sponsor health insurance plans, to oer
their terminating employees, and their families, the right to continue their health insurance
coverage through the employer's plan for 18 months. Obtaining coverage through the COBRA
is often expensive|102 percent of the average employer cost|and usually excludes pre-existing
conditions.
Since health insurance is often tied to employment in the U.S., many self-employed indi-
viduals do not have coverage. For example, in 1996, 31 percent of self-employed persons under
age 63 were without health insurance. This compares to 18.5 percent of wage/salary work-
ers that were lacking coverage (Perry and Rosen, 2004). Similarly in the period we consider,
483.1 (86.5) percent of male (female) wage/salary employees have health insurance whereas 65.8
(75.8) percent of the self-employed have coverage. Perry and Rosen (2004) nd that the lack
of health insurance coverage among the self-employed does not necessarily translate into worse
health outcomes when they are compared to their wage/salary counterparts. Meer and Rosen
(2002) note that the determinants of health status are mainly due to factors other than health
insurance (e.g., genetics, behavior, health care, environment). Our descriptive gures below
are consistent with these previous ndings, i.e. wage/salary employees and the self-employed
are very similar in terms of their self-reported health status despite the gap in health insurance
coverage. In what follows, we do not argue in favor of tax incentives to provide health insur-
ance coverage nor do we address whether the policy is eective in terms of improving health
outcomes for the self-employed. Our aim is simply to evaluate the eects of the policy on the
health insurance coverage for the self-employed, abstracting away from any welfare gains or
losses.
This paper proceeds in the following manner: Section 2 discusses the conceptual frame-
work and the empirical implementation. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis.
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Specication
This paper analyzes the eects of the TRA86 amendments on the likelihood that a
self-employed person has health insurance coverage as the policy holder. The TRA86 granted
self-employed persons the ability to deduct their (i.e. own, spouse, and dependents) health
insurance premiums from their taxable income. Self-employed individuals include single owners
of unincorporated businesses. Eligibility is restricted to unincorporated self-employed persons
with positive net prots who do not have access to employer-provided health insurance, for
example, through their spouse. Currently, self-employed persons are allowed to deduct 100
percent of their health insurance premiums from their taxable income|previously it had been
25, 30, 40, 45, 60, and 70 percent. Originally, the 25 percent deduction was temporary and
set to expire in 1992. The deductions were, however, made retroactive for persons who led
an amended return and were made permanent in 1996.2 In 1998, nearly 2.7 percent of all
2Note that the deductions are still not fully equalized as health insurance premiums, purchased by the
self-employed, cannot be deducted from payroll taxes. Thus, self-employed persons must pay SECA (Self-
5returns claimed the self-employed deduction and for the 2005 scal year, the estimated tax
expenditure corresponding to the deduction was about $3.2 billion (Lyke, 2005). While the
primary goal of the TRA86 was to equate the tax deductibility of health insurance premiums
for wage/salary employees and the self-employed, a secondary goal may have been to address
the unusually large rates of uninsurance among the self-employed population. This latter issue
is the question that this paper seeks to answer.
To provide a sense of how these deductions translated into real savings, Table 1 lists the
average real individual health insurance premiums and the corresponding after-tax premiums
re
ecting the tax savings.3 Information on the average health insurance premiums are from
the 1996-2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC). Greater
detail on the construction of these gures is provided below in Section 4. For example in
1996, the average real individual health insurance premium was $2,465. For individuals with
a 15 (28) percent MTR, this translated into a real savings of $100 ($187) when the TRA86-
mandated tax deduction equaled 30 percent. Thus, the after-tax real premium totaled $2,364
($2,277). By comparison in 2004, the average real individual health insurance premium rose to
$3,929. This translated into real savings of $600 ($1,119) for individuals with a 15 (28) percent
MTR as for the rst time self-employed persons were able to deduct the entire premium from
their taxable income. The corresponding after-tax real premium equaled $3,329 ($2,809). The
annual percentage changes over the entire period re
ect that the real premiums rose faster than
the value of the tax deduction. Therefore, the after-tax price of health insurance still increased
for the self-employed during the time period considered.
In order to examine the eects of the TRA86 amendments on the health insurance
coverage of the self-employed, we rst utilize a DD approach and follow G&P94 by comparing
the self-employed to wage/salary employees over time. For this purpose, we use the following
regression where the dependent variable, Y , takes on a value of \1" if individual i in state s
Employment Contributions Act) payroll taxes when purchasing insurance for themselves or their dependents
whereas wage/salary workers pay health insurance premiums with pre-tax dollars which are not subject to FICA
(Federal Insurance Contributions Act) taxes or federal income taxes. The latter was allowed in 1979 with the
passage of the Revenue Act of 1978.
3All real gures are expressed in constant 2006 US$ throughout the text and in the tables.










Some individuals may have health insurance coverage from alternative sources, such as through
a spouse's plan. The TRA86 amendments would not necessarily aect having any kind of
coverage but it is more likely that they provided incentives for the self-employed to obtain
coverage in their own name. Thus, we focus specically on having a health insurance plan as
the policy holder. By comparison, G&P94 focus on coverage under a private health insurance
plan either in one's own name or in someone else's name. They do this because the CPS
questionnaire changed in March 1988 making the survey responses regarding policy holder
status inconsistent over time. X is a vector including individual and family characteristics as
well as a constant term. SelfEmp takes on a value of \1" if an individual is self-employed, and
\0" otherwise (i.e. wage/salary employee). Y ear is the set of year xed eects, State is a vector
of state xed eects, and " is the error term which we assume is normally distributed. The
omitted year is 1995|the year in which the deduction equaled 25 percent, the least generous
in the time frame we analyze.4
The key identifying assumption in estimating our model is that in the absence of the
TRA86 amendments, the unobservable dierences between the self-employed (treatment group)
and the wage/salary employees (control group) would be the same over time. In other words,
the DD approach provides an unbiased estimate of the eect of the tax policy change assuming
that the unobservable trend factors do not vary across the groups. Another assumption made
in estimating equation (1) is that SelfEmp is exogenous. Over the time period we analyze, the
overall unincorporated self-employment rate increased from 6.6 percent in 1995 to 7.2 percent
in 2005, averaging 7.1 percent for the entire 10-year period. The gures provided in Tables 2
and 3 lend support for the aforementioned assumptions.
In Table 2 we exploit the longitudinal feature of the CPS in addressing the possible
endogeneity of any trends in self-employment. The CPS can be used to create a short panel
4An alternative specication would be, rather than including each year separately, to construct indicators by
grouping together the years in which the TRA86 tax deduction was similar and to interact them with SelfEmp.
For example, we could construct dummies for 1995-1998, 1999-2002, and 2003-2005. Our chosen specication is
actually more 
exible than this alternative since the DD estimates for any subperiod can be retrieved based on
our reported b s.
7of two-year cross sections by matching a subsample of individuals between each consecutive
survey year. This subset of the CPS is referred to as the \outgoing rotation group" (ORG).5
This feature of the CPS provides us with an opportunity to examine the possible eects of
the TRA86 amendments on the year-to-year changes in labor market status, i.e. between
wage/salary employment and self-employment. For this subset of individuals, we nd that the
fraction of individuals who switch jobs|from wage/salary employment into self-employment
and vice versa{in any given year is quite small; it is well under half a percent of our ORG
sample. This is likely because the two observations we have for each individual are only 12
months apart. Only about two percent of the sample switches over the entire 10-year period.
More importantly, there does not seem to be any patterns, in terms of gaining health
insurance coverage, as individuals move into self-employment; only about 0.2 percent of the
sample switch from wage/salary employment to self-employment and gain health insurance
coverage over the entire period considered. In fact, it is slightly more likely that they lose their
policy holder status when they switch to self-employment (0.5 percent). Similarly, among the
self-employed who switch into wage/salary employment, a larger portion gain coverage as a
policy holder rather than lose it. All of this re
ects the link between health insurance cover-
age and full-time wage/salary employment in the U.S. Overall, there does not seem to be any
discernable pattern over time that would indicate that the increasing generosity of the TRA86
amendments encouraged wage/salary employees to switch into self-employment.6 This is simi-
lar to the ndings of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996) who nd no eect of health insurance portability
on the likelihood of transition from wage/salary employment to self-employment. While we
are not suggesting that the decision to be self-employed is exogenous, it seems very unlikely
that the switch into self-employment is related to the likelihood of gaining health insurance
coverage. Nor does the decision seem to be made in response to the TRA86 amendments. The
identication of our model does not require that the decision to be self-employed is orthogonal
to the decision to have health insurance coverage. Rather it simply requires that the respective
changes be orthogonal.
5See the Data section below for a detailed description of how the ORG panel is created.
6To address the possibility that the increase in self-employment over this time period could be due to people
entering or re-entering the labor force, rather than switching from wage/salary employment into self-employment,
we performed a similar exercise for those who were not-working in the rst period and entered self-employment
in the following year. These results are omitted from Table 2 because there are very few people in each year
who make this switch leaving the conclusions unchanged.
8Since the ORG panel is short, Table 2 provides limited evidence that the self-employment
trends are independent of changes in health insurance coverage. As a further test of our
assumptions, Table 3 addresses yearly changes in the composition of the wage/salary and self-
employed groups. Considering the period we analyze spans 11 years, it is inevitable that the
composition of each of these groups varied over time. However, our identication strategy only
requires that trends in unobservable factors do not dier such that unbiased DD estimates
of the policy change can be obtained. In what follows, we focus on the trends in the main
observable characteristics to determine if the parallel trends assumption holds. To this end, we
perform a separate DD on a set of covariates to see if the trends in any of the key variables dier
in a systematic way between our treatment (i.e. self-employed) and control (i.e. wage/salaried)
groups. More specically, we regress each covariate on the set of year dummies, a self-employed
indicator, and the interactions.
Table 3 presents the coecient estimates of the interaction terms, for both men and
women. In general, there are very few instances in which any of the interaction terms gain
statistical signicance. None of these reveal any systematic pattern nor economic signicance
that would be of concern; the singular exception is the White indicator for the sample of
women. On the other hand, when we consider the after-tax price of health insurance there is
a clear dierence in the trends between the self-employed and the wage/salaried. The positive
and statistically signicant coecient estimates on the interaction terms reported in the last
column of Table 3 are consistent with the numbers in Table 1. Based on the gures provided
in Tables 2 and 3, the possible endogeneity or composition bias seems quite small and so we
proceed with our assumptions. As a further test of these assumptions, we perform a series of
robustness checks that consider dierent time periods and use dierent control groups in the
estimations that follow. These results are reported in Section 4.
We use a linear probability model (LPM) to estimate equation (1). Alternatively, we
could estimate equation (1) with a probit or logit model. As discussed in Hotz et al. (2006),
LPMs in DD settings are preferable because they are less computationally intense and easier to
interpret.7 This specication allows us to see how self-employed persons were aected, relative
7Ai and Norton (2003) discuss the problems associated with estimating the marginal eects for the interaction
terms in non-linear models. They show that in order to correctly estimate the marginal eect of an interaction
term, the entire cross-derivative must be calculated. However, there are diculties associated with multiple
interaction terms, as in the case of our model.
9to wage/salary employees, and to gauge the eects of the increased generosity of the TRA86
health insurance deductions over time. Hence, the b s are the DD estimates. The literature
(e.g., Perry and Rosen, 2004) has established that the rate of health insurance coverage is
lower for self-employed persons than for wage/salary individuals. Thus, we expect the b 
 to be
negative. If the TRA86 amendments did in fact encourage the self-employed to obtain health
insurance coverage as a policy holder over time, we would expect the b s to be positive.
The dierences in terms of health insurance coverage between the self-employed and
the wage/salary employees is largely due to the high costs associated with obtaining health
insurance in the private non-group market, although other factors such as dierences in risk
attitudes, age, etc. of the self-employed population might be important as well. In studying the
initial TRA86 tax deduction and the demand for health insurance, G&P94 specify a discrete
choice model of individual insurance demand. Based on their specication we also estimate the
following model:
Yits = Xits +  SelfEmpits +
2005 X
t=1996
tY earits + Stateitss + Pits + its; (2)
where Y , X, SelfEmp, Y ear, and State are dened as before and  is the error term which is
normally distributed. P is a measure of the after-tax premium. We estimate this model with
a LPM as well as with a probit. We conduct the empirical analyses of equations (1) and (2)
separately for men and women. Then, we divide our sample according to dierences in family
structure and eligibility. Details on these estimations as well as the results are reported in
Section 4.
3 Data
The data used in this paper come from the CPS. The CPS is a monthly survey spon-
sored by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Each month the CPS
surveys some 50,000 households (\occupied units") and is designed to represent the U.S. civil-
ian, non-institutionalized population.8 Respondents are asked questions about themselves and
persons in the household who are ages 16 and above. The questions center on demographic
8Beginning in July 2001, the sample size increased to 60,000 occupied households.
10characteristics and labor market activities but include other annual supplementary information
as well (e.g., health insurance, tobacco use, computer ownership). The respondent (\reference
person") is often the owner or renter of the selected housing unit.
This study uses data from the 1996-2006 CPS surveys. The 1996 survey was the rst year
in which detailed questions concerning the source of health insurance coverage were asked. The
analysis for this paper focuses on workers between the ages of 25 and 60. We exclude individuals
who were: 1) disabled; 2) full-time students; 3) in the Armed Forces; as well as those who were
4) unemployed; 5) not in the labor force; and/or 6) working without pay.9 In our sample, we
not only include the respondents but also any other individual in their family (e.g., spouse)
who satises the age restriction and the other criteria mentioned above.
We perform the empirical analysis for men and women separately. In addition, we divide
men and women into further subsamples based on family structure and eligibility status. Mar-
ital status is important in terms of having alternative sources of coverage.10 Single individuals
are a special group since they can have coverage only as a policy holder. Married individuals,
on the other hand, may be covered under their spouse's health insurance plan. We further
explore the possibility that the presence of children may reduce the likelihood of self-insuring
by considering married persons without children. Finally, we also address the eligibility restric-
tions of the TRA86, as noted previously, by identifying the individuals who are not covered as
a dependent under an employer-provided health insurance plan and whose real annual earnings
are at least $2000.
The CPS uses a 4-8-4 sampling scheme meaning that each household is in the survey for
four consecutive months, out for the next eight, and then returns for the following four months.
This survey design creates a longitudinal, albeit short, component called the \outgoing rotation
group" (ORG). Our analysis uses a series of pooled cross-sections which includes duplicate
observations on individuals who are part of the ORG sample.11 About 38 percent of our sample
is composed of ORG individuals. The pooled cross-sections include repeated observations for
9Later, in Section 4, we expand the sample to include not-working persons|i.e. individuals in groups 4, 5,
and 6.
10Abraham et al. (2006) and Beeson Royalty and Abraham (2006) address the joint nature of the household
demand for health insurance.
11In a given survey, individuals are uniquely identied by two variables: a household identier (HHID) and
an individual line number within the household (LINENO). Across surveys, one needs to supplement these two
variables with others in order to match individuals over time. Following Madrian and Lefgren (1999), we use
gender, race, age, educational attainment, and foreign birth status to obtain a good match.
11the ORG respondents and thus we adjust the standard errors by clustering within individuals
in order to correct for the possible autocorrelation.12 This allows us to maintain the largest
sample size and improves the precision of our estimates.13
The 1996-2006 CPS cross-sectional data correspond to 1995-2005. This is because the
health insurance questions are asked once a year in March and refer to coverage at any time
during the previous calendar year. The CPS contains information on health insurance coverage
from the following sources: 1) a private plan through an employer (either as a policy holder
or dependent); 2) a private plan purchased directly (either as a policy holder or dependent);
3) a private plan provided by someone outside of the household; 4) Medicare; 5) Medicaid;
or 6) another type of plan (i.e. state-only plan, Military Health plan, and Indian Health
Service).14 The dependent variable used in our empirical analysis is whether an individual was
covered by a non-public health insurance plan in their own name in the prior year (i.e. policy
holders in categories 1 and 2). Individuals are considered self-employed if they indicate being
self-employed, in terms of the longest job held within the past year, and if their business was
unincorporated. Since the longest job held corresponds to the prior year, it accords well with the
health insurance variables. This is also consistent with the BLS' denition of self-employment
(Hipple, 2004).
The controls for individual characteristics used in the analysis include age and its square.
The three race variables are White, Black, and other. The ethnic categories include Hispanic
and other. We include the following levels of completed schooling: high school graduate, some
college, college degree, or an advanced degree. Those with less than a high school degree are
the omitted category. For the family characteristics, we form the following dummy variables
for the number of own-children ages 18 and younger: having no children (excluded category),
one child only, and more than one child. Family income is dened as the combined income of
all family members during the last 12 months. It includes income from jobs, net income from
a business/farm/rental unit, pensions, dividends, interest, social security payments, and any
12As Moulton (1990), Bertrand et al. (1994), and Donald and Lang (2007) have pointed out, regressing
individual outcomes on aggregate-level policies (e.g., TRA86) that similarly aect all individuals in one group
(e.g., self-employed in a given year) can drastically understate the standard errors of the DD estimates. As it
turns out our DD estimates are not statistically signicant, thus making the suggested correction redundant.
The coecient estimates would remain unchanged while the standard errors would be larger.
13The results are robust to eliminating either the rst or the second observation on each ORG individual,
thus omitting repeated observations on each individual.
14Note that these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
12other money income received by family members ages 15 and above. This measure is adjusted
for in
ation and for the number of family members.15
Table 4a (4b) provides the descriptive statistics for men (women) by employment status.
To begin, the sample of working men|both wage/salary and self-employed|is larger than for
women. Self-employed persons are slightly older than their wage/salary counterparts. A smaller
fraction of the self-employed are minorities and fewer of them report working the typical hours
per week (36-55 hours) compared to the wage/salary employees. While most men are full-time
workers, there is a noticeably larger fraction of women who are part-time workers. Since we
focus on prime-age working individuals, the large majority of the sample reports their health
status as excellent, very good, or good. The wage/salary employees and the self-employed are
very similar in terms of their self-reported health status. For both sexes, a larger portion of the
wage/salary employees have some type of health insurance coverage than do the self-employed
(83.1 versus 65.8 percent for men and 86.5 versus 75.8 percent for women, respectively). This
dierence between the two groups is even more pronounced when one considers only the policy
holders (71.9 versus 39.2 percent for men and 60.2 versus 26.9 percent for women).
The majority of our sample is married, and self-employed people are even more likely to
be so than wage/salary workers. This could be due to the small dierences in age between the
two groups. The adjusted family income is higher among the wage/salary men than the self-
employed men which is also partly re
ected in the MTRs. Among the married persons, a larger
percentage of men and women in wage/salary employment are married to spouses who have
some source of health insurance coverage but fewer of them report being married to spouses who
are policy holders. In both the wage/salary and the self-employed samples, it is more common
for the women to be married to spouses with their own employer-provided health insurance plan
than it is for men. For example, among the men in wage/salary employment (self-employment),
37.1 (42.3) percent are married to spouses who are policy holders of employer-provided health
insurance plans, whereas the corresponding gure for women is 63.6 (62.2) percent. In the next
section, we present the estimation results of our DD and insurance demand models and discuss
some robustness checks.
15Adjusted family income is total family income divided by the square root of the number of family members.
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Tables 5a and 5b provide the simple sample means and the unadjusted DD estimates
for men and women, respectively. Between 1995 and 2005, there are downward trends in the
rate of health insurance coverage as a policy holder. For example in 1995, 70.7 (58.7) percent
of all men (women) in our sample had health insurance coverage as a policy holder whereas in
2005 this rate dropped to 65.9 (57.1) percent. Similarly for the wage/salary men (women), the
rates fell from 73.0 (60.4) to 68.6 (59.1) percent. While the rate of coverage is always higher
for wage/salary employees than for self-employed workers, there are corresponding decreases
in the rates of coverage for the self-employed men and women over time as well. In 1995, 41.1
(28.1) percent of the self-employed men (women) had coverage under their own name; this
gure drops to 34.3 (23.0) percent 10 years later. The simple dierences listed in columns 4
and 5 illustrate these year-to-year changes for each worker-type. The unadjusted DD estimates
provided in the last columns of Tables 5a and 5b reveal the gap in coverage, that is growing
over time, between self-employed persons and wage/salary workers. These DD estimates are
statistically insignicant except for women in 2005. While crude, these gures are some of
the rst evidence that the TRA86 amendments did not help in eliminating, nor reducing, the
gap in coverage for self-employed persons. Next, we estimate a series of DD specications by
controlling for a variety of other factors in a regression context.
The estimates of equation (1) can be found in Tables 6a and 6b; the full set of results are
available in Appendix Tables 1a and 1b. Each regression also includes a set of state-specic
eects (not reported) to account for any state-level dierences. The regression results are
summarized as follows: Individuals are less likely to have coverage in their own name if they
are self-employed, Black, Hispanic, less educated, younger, a single man, or a married woman,
and have lower family incomes. The DD technique is performed by comparing self-employed
persons to wage/salary workers relative to 1995|the year in which the TRA86 tax deduction
was the least generous (25 percent) during the time period we analyze.
Table 6a (6b), column 1, provides the estimates of equation (1) for all men (women) in
our sample. Clearly, being self-employed lowers the likelihood that one has a health insurance
plan in his/her name. The negative and statistically signicant coecient estimate on this
indicator implies that the coverage rates are about 32.6 (30.2) percentage points lower for
14self-employed men (women) compared to those in wage/salary employment. For example,
this could be due to dierences in risk attitudes between these two groups. The coecient
estimates on the year dummies are almost all negative and gain statistical signicance in the
latter years. Jointly, the year dummies are statistically signicant and collectively they suggest
that the rate of coverage has declined over time for both groups; a nding consistent with the
gures presented in Tables 5a and 5b. In contrast, the estimated coecients on the interaction
terms are nearly all negative but never statistically signicant, neither individually nor jointly.
The singular exception to this is for the women; the last interaction term is negative and
statistically signicant at the ve percent level. Again consistent with the basic DD presented
in Tables 5a and 5b, this implies that the TRA86 amendments did not help to close the gap
in health insurance coverage between the self-employed and wage/salary employees. Although
the few statistically signicant coecient estimates suggest that the gap in coverage between
the two groups has grown in size for selected periods, jointly they do not indicate any economic
signicance.
Tables 6a and 6b, columns 2-4, restrict the sample by family structure. Column 2 considers
single persons. This group is unique in that they do not have any other possible sources of
health insurance coverage from another family member. (Recall that full-time students and
individuals under the age of 25 are omitted from our sample.) Perhaps due to this lack of
alternatives, the gap in health insurance coverage between the wage/salary employees and
the self-employed is smaller for the singles than it was for the full sample. While smaller in
magnitude, the estimated coecient on SelfEmp remains statistically signicant. In the case
of single men (women), the only individual interaction term that gains statistical signicance
is negative. So far, we have yet to nd evidence that the gap in coverage has decreased
over time as the tax deductions became more generous. Column 3 considers married persons
and column 4 refers to married persons without children. While health insurance coverage
decisions are often made in the context of the household for married couples, the presence of
children presumably limits the likelihood of self-insuring. Again, the interaction terms remain
jointly (and individually) statistically insignicant for both groups (with the marginal exception
of married women without children in 2005). In sum, redening our sample according to
family structure leaves the results unchanged|the DD estimates show no eect of the TRA86
amendments.
15The TRA86 restricted eligibility to persons with positive net prots who do not have
access to employer-provided health insurance. Unfortunately, the CPS data do not include
information on prots earned. In columns 5 and 6 of Tables 6a and 6b, we use the same income
restriction as in G&P94 and eliminate those persons who earn less than $2000 per year in real
terms. These columns also eliminate anyone who is covered as a dependent under an employer-
provided health insurance plan, although it is not clear whether this rule is being enforced. We
refer to these individuals as \eligible" but given the limitations of our data we cannot determine
with certainty if an individual has access to employer-provided health insurance.16 Although
our eligibility classication may not be exact, it provides us with an opportunity to investigate
this group more closely. The incentives provided by the tax deductions are greater for these
individuals, holding everything else constant. Restricting our sample in this manner produces
some statistical signicance on a limited number of the individual interaction terms, but each
coecient estimate remains negative. In the case of eligible men (see Table 6a, column 5) the
interaction terms are jointly statistically signicant (albeit at the 10 percent level). However,
the DD estimates do not suggest that the gap in coverage is closing over time as the individual
interaction terms, including those that are statistically signicant, are all negative.
Overall the results presented in Tables 6a and 6b are consistent with the unadjusted
DD estimates provided in Tables 5a and 5b. The DD estimates are almost always statistically
insignicant in the regression context (with the exception of eligible men and married women
without children) when we are able to include other controls in the analysis but the estimated
coecients on the interaction terms are never positive. If the TRA86 amendments did in fact
encourage self-employed persons to obtain coverage, the b s would be positive. Together these
ndings suggest that the gap between the wage/salary employees and the self-employed was
not reduced by the tax deductions introduced through the TRA86 amendments. In order to
conrm these ndings, we performed two robustness checks. First, we expanded our sample
to include those individuals who were not working. An individual is dened as not-working
if he/she is unemployed, not part of the labor force, or working without pay. As before,
we consider the longest job held within the past year for these classications. Like the self-
employed, not-working individuals do not have access to employer-provided health insurance.
16The reasons for this are: 1) if a spouse reports no employer-provided insurance, it does not necessarily
imply that he/she was not oered such a plan; and 2) even if a spouse has coverage under such a plan, we
cannot conrm whether the spouse was given the option of including the respondent under the policy.
16While both groups purchase their health insurance in the private non-group market, the not-
working group was not eligible for the tax deductions. For this robustness check, we added
a dummy variable for not-working and its interactions with the year dummies.17 Second, we
re-estimated our model using 1995-1997 as the omitted reference years instead of omitting a
single year (i.e. 1995). None of these exercises alter the main conclusions presented above.
Our results so far indicate that there has been no response to the tax deduction. While
the DD analysis is illustrative, it does not account for individual variation in the after-tax price
of health insurance. As G&P94 show, the eect of the policy depends on the individual's MTR
which was not previously accounted for in our analysis. Next, we investigate the degree of
price elasticity of demand for coverage as a policy holder using the TRA86 amendments as an
identication strategy. This provides a ner measure of the policy change compared to the DD
model because it explicitly accounts for the rise and the individual variation in the premiums.
In order to obtain an estimate of the price elasticity of demand, we explicitly control for the
dierences over time in the after-tax premium of health insurance between the self-employed
individuals and the wage/salary employees. As discussed above, during the period we consider
the coverage rates have been decreasing for both groups. Cutler (2003) studies the reasons
for the decline in health insurance coverage rates in the 1990s despite the economic boom the
U.S. experienced. He nds that the entire decline among the wage/salary employees can be
explained by the increase in employees' costs of insurance plans.
Wage/salary employees face lower premiums compared to the self-employed not only
because their employers sponsor part of the premium but also because employer-provided
insurance is based on group rates that are substantially below individually purchased plan
rates. G&P94 indicate that while some self-employed might have access to group insurance
coverage, most do not. They calculate the after-tax premium of health insurance for a single
year with data on the distribution of expenditures on health care and insurance purchased in
the non-group market from the 1977 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES).
We obtain average individual premium gures using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-
Insurance Component (MEPS-IC). The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
make available annual tables from the MEPS-IC corresponding to 1996-2004 which list the
17This exercise was only performed only for columns 1-4 of Tables 6a and 6b because we were not able to
impose the $2000 earnings threshold for this sample to explore the set of eligibles.
17average individual premiums per enrolled employee at private-sector establishments that oer
health insurance.18 The gures are provided for each state and vary by rm size. For the
wage/salary employees, we use the overall rm averages, by state and by year.
The AHRQ's MEPS does not have similar information for privately-purchased non-group
plans. In fact, obtaining meaningful and reliable average premium gures for individually
purchased plans from any source is nearly impossible.19 Since no reliable estimates exist, we
proxy for the premium of plans purchased in the non-group market with the MEPS-IC gures
corresponding to rms employing less than 10 employees. These premiums re
ect the best proxy
for what a self-employed individual would face in the market for non-group health insurance. In
order to construct an after-tax gure, we obtain estimated MTRs using the NBER's TAXSIM
program. This program calculates individuals' MTRs using information reported on their tax
returns including the tax year, state of residence, marital status, exemptions, various sources
of income (such as wage/salary, dividend, other property, social security, and pensions) and
transfers (such as unemployment compensation and welfare).20 As in G&P94, the after-tax





I  (1   ) if wage/salary employee
T  (1   max(;TRAt)) if self-employed,
(3)
where I is the employee's contribution to his/her health insurance plan and  is the fraction of
the health insurance cost that is claimed as an itemized deduction on one's income tax return.21
Individuals (both wage/salary and self-employed) are allowed to deduct their health insurance
premiums from their taxable income as long as the cost, together with the other eligible medical
care expenditures, constitute at least 7.5 percent of their adjusted gross income (AGI).  is
the individual's MTR on earned income, and T is the total health insurance premium which
18We approximate the gures corresponding to 1995 and 2005 by adjusting the adjacent year's gure for the
rate of in
ation (as measured by the Consumer Price Index)|i.e. between 1995-1996 and 2004-2005, respectively.
19MEPS has a Household Component (MEPS-HC) which is a survey of individuals and families. The MEPS-
HC asks the respondents, who report having coverage from an individual policy, what their out-of-pocket pre-
miums are. This is a very small sample and hence cannot provide reliable summary statistics at the state-level
for each year between 1995 and 2005.
20For more information on TAXSIM, see www.nber.org/taxsim or Feenberg and Coutts (1993).
21Note that this may not re
ect the true cost of the employer-sponsored plan because of possible substitution
between wages and fringe benets (Levy, 1998, 2006) and the fact that some employees working for small rms
do not get to pay for their premiums with pre-tax dollars (Gruber and McKnight, 2003).
18represents both the employee's and the employer's contribution to the health insurance plan.
TRAt is the deduction rate allowed by the TRA86 in each year (e.g., TRA1996 = 0:3).
G&P94 faced additional challenges in estimating the price elasticity of demand because
during the period they analyzed changes other than the partial deductibility of health insurance
premiums by the self-employed occurred. First, the MTRs were substantially reduced; they
note that the top MTR dropped from 50 to 28 percent with the passage of the TRA86. Second,
the amount of permissible medical expenses one could deduct from their income tax returns
was raised from ve to 7.5 percent of AGI. Third, the allowable deduction, for taxpayers who
do not itemize, rose sharply from $3760 to $5000 within a two-year period. It is easier in our
case to form a price measure because our period of analysis is free of other confounding policy
changes.
To begin, we estimated equation (2) omitting P. As was the case with the DD model
presented above, the estimated coecient on SelfEmp is negative and statistically signi-
cant. However, once we include the after-tax health insurance premium in our regression, b   is
substantially smaller. Table 7 reports only the coecient estimate on P and the price semi-
elasticity of demand; the full set of results can be found in the Appendix Tables 2a and 2b.22
The rst set of results in Table 7 (M1), corresponding to the men, report the LPM estimates of
equation (2). The coecient estimates of s and their standard errors can be found in the rst
two rows. b  represents the derivative of demand with respect to the after-tax price (@Y
@P ), which
is statistically signicant at the one percent level in all specications. b  is then multiplied by
the corresponding cell average of the after-tax health insurance premium for the self-employed
to obtain the price semi-elasticity which is reported in the third row.23 For example, in (M1)
column 1, the partial derivative of Y with respect to P is -0.107. To obtain the price semi-
elasticity we multiply this gure by 2.955, yielding -0.316. Thus, a one percent decrease in
the after-tax health insurance premium increases the probability that a self-employed man has
coverage as the policy holder by 0.32 percentage points suggesting that this group's demand is
relatively price inelastic.
22This specication explicitly controls for the after-tax price of health insurance, P, unlike the DD model.
Since P varies by self-employment status, state of residence, year, and MTR, concerns about understated
standard errors are no longer valid (see Donald and Lang, 2007). In estimating equation (2) we no longer regress
individual outcomes on aggregate-level policies as was the case for the DD in equation (1).
23Following G&P94, we use the after-tax price for the self-employed since the focus is on their behavioral
response to the TRA86 and the wage/salary persons merely act as controls for economy-wide events.
19Columns 2 and 3 divide the sample into single and married persons. The price semi-
elasticity of demand for single men is larger in magnitude (-0.688) and reveals a greater degree
of price sensitivity compared to those who are married. This nding was expected since singles
lack alternative sources of coverage and hence are more likely to respond to this particular
change in policy. Column 4 corresponds to the set of married individuals without children and
indicates a relatively elastic demand, compared to all married men. Finally, columns 5 and 6
consider the set of eligible respondents. As expected we see a greater response to the TRA86
amendments among the eligibles. Further restricting the sample to include only those eligible
persons without children (i.e. column 6) increases the estimate of the semi-elasticity of demand
from -0.415 to -0.597. This again re
ects that the lack of children makes individuals relatively
more price sensitive.
The results for the sample of women are provided in Table 7 (W1). Again the b s are
all statistically signicant. In addition, they re
ect the same order of magnitude as did the
estimates for men. Even the largest estimate of the price semi-elasticity, 1:005 (single women),
displays a very limited response to changes in the after-tax price of health insurance. Thus, for
both men and women we see the largest response to the tax deductions, in terms of estimated
price elasticity, by the singles and the eligibles without children.
Alternatively, we estimated equation (2) with a probit model. The estimates from this
model are found in Table 7, rows (M2) and (W2). Provided here are the coecient estimate
on P, its derivative (i.e. marginal eect), and the corresponding price semi-elasticity.24 Over-
all, these results indicate somewhat smaller estimates of the price semi-elasticity compared to
the gures obtained for LPM. An additional robustness check is the expansion of our sam-
ple to include those individuals who were not-working, for the reasons mentioned previously.
Finally, rather than clustering our standard errors, we eliminated the duplicate observations
corresponding to the persons in the ORG. For this purpose, we began by eliminating the rst
observation on each ORG person and next eliminated the second observation instead. Our
conclusions were not altered by either of these exercises.25
In several instances G&P94 also obtained statistically insignicant responses to price
24To calculate the marginal eects reported in Table 7, we evaluate the derivative with respect to price for
each individual observation and take the sample average. We also calculated the marginal eects using only the
self-employed sub-sample and the results are virtually identical.
25The results of these robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.
20changes. However, their statistically signicant price derivatives yielded larger price elasticities
compared to the ones we estimate. For example, in the case of single men, they nd that a
one percent increase in the cost of insurance decreases the probability of coverage by about
1.8 percentage points. As a nal exercise, we attempt to provide an explanation for these
dierences. To do this, we re-estimate equation (2) again with an LPM model but use G&P94's
denition of Y |namely, health insurance coverage as a policy holder or in someone else's name
(i.e. categories 1, 2, 3 as described in Section 3). The dierence between (M1) and (M3), as
well as (W1) and (W3), is relatively larger for married individuals and negligible for the singles.
Our estimates are still smaller than what G&P94 nd and indicate that at least part of the
dierence stems from the denition of coverage. By not considering the policy holder status,
we along with G&P94 are probably capturing either the response of the individual or possibly
that of the spouse to the policy change without begin able to distinguish between the two.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze how the tax deductions provided under the TRA86 amendments
aected the rates of health insurance coverage among the self-employed. We nd that even
the full-deductibility of health insurance premiums was not sucient to compensate the self-
employed for the high costs associated with obtaining health insurance coverage in the private
non-group market. Using data from the CPS, corresponding to the period of 1995-2005, we
obtain DD estimates comparing the self-employed to wage/salary employees. These results
provide no evidence that the tax deductions were sucient to oset the rising premiums during
this period. Thus, they did not reduce nor eliminate the gap in coverage between these two
groups. Estimates of the price elasticity of demand reveal a very limited response to reductions
in the after-tax premium. This conclusion is consistent with earlier ndings that the provision of
subsidies in the non-group market is unlikely to generate sizeable reactions among the uninsured
(Marquis and Long, 1995; Gruber, 2005; Gruber and Washington, 2005; Holtz-Eakin, 2005).
The uninsurance problem gripping America has already become one of the leading issues in
the upcoming 2008 Presidential elections. Having addressed the prior lack of prescription drug
coverage for Medicare recipients with the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan in
2006, President Bush is now proposing a series of standard tax deductions aimed at addressing
21the nation's growing uninsured population. While our conclusions pertain to the self-employed
population and may not generalize to other groups with high rates of uninsurance, our results
do suggest that these types of policies, by themselves, may not provide sucient incentives
for individuals purchasing health insurance in the private non-group market. Even when the
tax deductions cover a substantial portion of the total premium, obtaining coverage in this
market may still be dicult due to other costs involved (Pauly and Nichols, 2002; Blumberg
and Nichols, 2004). These include, but are not limited to, search costs, potential denial, and
exclusion restrictions on pre-existing conditions. Last but not least, non-group policies are
typically not as generous as the employer-provided plans in terms of their cost-sharing features
(such as co-payments, co-insurance rates, deductibles) and extent of coverage. Quantifying
these other costs is nearly impossible due to data limitations. And so it seems oering tax
deductions alone, without adopting other policies, may not remedy the uninsurance problem.
Further questions need to be answered to address other relevant issues that are beyond
the scope of the current analysis. For example, how has the non-group health insurance market
been aected by these tax deductions? Were rms encouraged to enter the market as the tax
credits became more generous? How would extending the tax deductions to other persons, e.g.,
the not-working, aect the rates of coverage? Would the tax deductions encourage individuals,
who currently have employer-provided health insurance, to purchase their plans in the non-
group market instead? Finally, what other regulations should be adopted in the non-group
market to ensure that the tax deductions have the intended outcomes? Future research on all
of these issues is critical in providing a more complete answer to the question of whether tax
incentives are the solution to the problem of the uninsured.
22References
[1] Abraham, J.M., W.B. Vogt, M.S. Gaynor, 2006, \How Do Households Choose Their
Employer-Based Health Insurance?" Inquiry, 43(4), pp. 315-332.
[2] Ai, C. and E.C. Norton, 2003, \Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Model," Economic
Letters, 80, pp. 123-129.
[3] Beeson Royalty, A. and J.M. Abraham, 2006, \Health Insurance and Labor Market Out-
comes: Joint Decision-Making within Households," Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9),
pp. 1561-1577.
[4] Bertrand, M., E. Du
o, and S. Mullainathan, 2004, \How Much Should We Trust
Dierences-in-Dierences Estimates?"Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), pp. 249-
275.
[5] Blumberg, L.J. and L.M. Nichols, 2004, \Why are so Many Americans Uninsured? A
Conceptual Framework, Summary of the Evidence, and Delineation of the Gaps in our
Knowledge," Health Policy and the Uninsured. C.G. McLaughlin, ed., Washington D.C.;
Urban Institute Press, pp. 35-95.
[6] Buchmueller, T.C. and R.G. Valletta, 1996, \The Eects of Employer-Provided Health
Insurance on Worker Mobility," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 49(3), pp. 439-
455.
[7] Cutler, D.M., 2003, \Employee Costs and the Decline in Health Insurance Coverage,"
Forum for Health Economics & Policy, 6(3), pp. 1-27.
[8] Donald, S.G. and K. Lang, 2007, \Inference with Dierence in Dierences and Other Panel
Data," Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2), pp. 221-233.
[9] Feenberg, D and E. Coutts. 1993, \An Introduction to the TAXSIM Model," Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, 12(1), pp. 189-194.
[10] Finkelstein, A., 2002, \The Eect of Tax Subsidies to Employer-Provided Supplementary
Health Insurance: Evidence from Canada," Journal of Public Economics, 84, pp. 305-339.
[11] Gilleskie, D.B. and B.F. Lutz, 2002, \The Impact of Employer-Provided Health Insurance
on Dynamic Employment Transitions,"Journal of Human Resources, 37(1), pp. 129-162.
[12] Gruber, J., 2005, \Tax Policy for Health Insurance," Tax Policy and the Economy, vol.
19. J. Poterba, ed., Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, pp. 39-63.
[13] Gruber, J. and B.C. Madrian, 1994, \Health Insurance and Job Mobility: The Eects of
Public Policy on Job-Lock," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48(1), pp. 86-102.
[14] Gruber, J. and B.C. Madrian, 1997, \Employment Separation and Health Insurance Cov-
erage," Journal of Public Economics, 66, pp. 349-382.
[15] Gruber, J. and B.C. Madrian, 2004, \Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job Mobility:
A Critical Review of the Literature,"Health Policy and the Uninsured. C.G. McLaughlin,
ed., Washington D.C.; Urban Institute Press.
23[16] Gruber, J. and E. Washington, 2005, \Subsidies to Employee Health Insurance Premiums
and the Health Insurance Market,"Journal of Health Economics, 24(2), pp. 253-276.
[17] Gruber, J. and J. Poterba, 1994, \Tax Incentives and the Decision to Purchase Health
Insurance: Evidence from the Self-Employed," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, pp.
701-733.
[18] Gruber, J. and R. McKnight, 2003, \Why Did Employee Health Insurance Contributions
Rise," Journal of Health Economics, 22(6), pp. 1085-1104. 109, pp. 701-733.
[19] Heim, B.T. and I.Z. Lurie, 2007, \Do Increased Premium Subsidies Aect How Much
Health Insurance Is Purchased? Evidence from the Self-Employed," Working Paper.
[20] Hipple, S., 2004, \Self-Employment in the United States: An Update," Monthly Labor
Review, 127(7), pp. 13-23.
[21] Holtz-Eakin, D., 2005, \The Price Sensitivity of Demand for Nongroup Health Insurance,"
Congressional Budget Oce Background Paper.
[22] Holtz-Eakin, D., J.R. Penrod, and H.S. Rosen, 1996, \Health Insurance and the Supply
of Entrepreneurs," Journal of Public Economics, 62, pp. 209-235.
[23] Hotz, J.V., C.H. Mullin, and J.K. Scholz, 2006, \Examining the Eect of the Earned
Income Tax Credit on the Labor Market Participation of Families on Welfare," NBER
Working Paper, No. 11968.
[24] Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2005, \Health Insurance Coverage in
America: 2005 Data Update."
[25] Levy, H., 1998, \Why Pays for Health Insurance? Employee Contributions to Health
Insurance Premiums," Working Paper.
[26] Levy, H., 2006, \Health Insurance and the Wage Gap," NBER Working Paper No. 11975.
[27] Lyke, Bob, 2005. \Tax Benets for Health Insurance and Expenses: Current Legislation,"
Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, IB98037.
[28] Madrian, B.C., 1994, \Employment-Based Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Is There
Evidence of Job-Lock?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, pp. 27-54.
[29] Madrian, B.C., 2006, \The U.S. Health Care System and Labor Markets," NBER Working
Paper, No. 11980.
[30] Madrian, B.C. and L.J. Lefgren, 1999, \A Note on Longitudinally Matching Current
Population Survey (CPS) Respondents," NBER Technical Working Paper, No. 247.
[31] Marquis, M.S. and S.H. Long, 1995, \Worker Demand for Health Insurance in the Non-
group Market," Journal of Health Economics, 14(1), pp. 47-63.
[32] Meer, J. and H.S. Rosen, 2002, \Insurance, Health, and the Utilization of Medical Ser-
vices," CEPS Working Paper, No. 85.
24[33] Moulton, B.R., 1990, \An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Eects of Aggregate
Variables on Micro Units,"Review of Economics and Statistics, 72(2), pp. 334-338.
[34] Pauly, M.V. and L.M. Nichols, 2002, \The Nongroup Health Insurance Market: Short on
Facts, Long on Opinions and Policy Disputes," Health Aairs Web Exclusive, W325-W344.
[35] Perry, C. W. and H.S. Rosen, 2004, \The Self-Employed are Less Likely than Wage Earners
to Have Health Insurance than Wage-Earners. So What?" Public Policy and the Economics
of Entrepreneurship. D. Holtz-Eakin and H. Rosen, ed., Cambridge, MA; MIT Press pp.
23-58.
[36] Thomasson, M., 2002, \From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century Development
of U.S. Health Insurance," Explorations in Economic History, 39, pp. 233-253.
[37] Thomasson, M., 2003, \The Importance of Group Coverage: How Tax Policy Shaped U.S.
Health Insurance," American Economic Review, 93, pp. 1373-1384.
25Annual %Δ Annual %Δ
Tax deduction as a  Average Real After-tax in after-tax Real After-tax in after-tax
Year % of premium real premium tax savings HI premium HI premium tax savings HI premium HI premium
1995 25% $2,515 $81 $2,433 - $152 $2,363 -
1996 30% $2,465 $100 $2,364 -2.83% $187 $2,277 -3.62%
1997 40% $2,454 $133 $2,321 -1.83% $247 $2,206 -3.13%
1998 45% $2,512 $158 $2,355 1.45% $294 $2,218 0.55%
1999 60% $2,601 $230 $2,371 0.68% $429 $2,172 -2.10%
2000 60% $2,712 $270 $2,442 2.99% $505 $2,207 1.64%
2001 60% $2,922 $289 $2,633 7.85% $539 $2,383 7.96%
2002 70% $3,251 $374 $2,877 9.25% $699 $2,552 7.11%
2003 100% $3,594 $575 $3,019 4.96% $1,074 $2,521 -1.23%
2004 100% $3,929 $600 $3,329 10.26% $1,119 $2,809 11.44%
2005 100% $4,159 $618 $3,541 6.37% $1,154 $3,005 6.97%
MTR=28%
Table 1: Health insurance premiums and the corresponding deductions in taxable income, 1995-2005
are expressed in constant 2006 US$.  MTR = marginal tax rate.  Source: MEPS.
MTR=15%
Notes: Prices reflect the average premiums per enrolled employee at small private-sector establishments (fewer than 10 employees) that offer health insurance.  Real amountsgain HI policy  lose HI policy  gain HI policy  lose HI policy 
Year holder status holder status holder status holder status
1995 414 (0.21%) 0.02% 0.04% 438 (0.22%) 0.04% 0.03%
1996 613 (0.31%) 0.03% 0.06% 306 (0.15%) 0.03% 0.02%
1997 393 (0.20%) 0.02% 0.04% 423 (0.21%) 0.04% 0.02%
1998 371 (0.19%) 0.02% 0.04% 394 (0.20%) 0.04% 0.01%
1999 393 (0.20%) 0.02% 0.05% 395 (0.20%) 0.04% 0.02%
2000 371 (0.19%) 0.02% 0.04% 387 (0.19%) 0.05% 0.01%
2001 491 (0.25%) 0.02% 0.07% 519 (0.26%) 0.06% 0.03%
2002 470 (0.24%) 0.02% 0.05% 511 (0.26%) 0.05% 0.02%
2003 456 (0.23%) 0.02% 0.06% 417 (0.21%) 0.04% 0.02%
2004 464 (0.23%) 0.02% 0.04% 484 (0.24%) 0.05% 0.02%
All years 4,436 (2.23%) 0.19% 0.50% 4,274 (2.15%) 0.43% 0.20%
Number of switchers
Previously self-employed
% of switchers who
to self-employment (%) to wage/salary (%)
Notes: 
†The figures correspond to the men and women in the outgoing rotation group (ORG) only (N=199,161).
Table 2: Health insurance (HI) policy holder status among switchers
†
Previously wage/salary
% of switchers who
Number of switchersYears of  Number of Adjusted
+ After-tax
++
Covariate Age White Black Hispanic schooling Excellent Very good Good Fair Poor Married children family income price of HI
Self-emp × 1996 0.020 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 0.192 0.017 -0.004 -0.001 -0.014 0.001 -0.019 -0.026 0.463** -0.011
Self-emp × 1997 0.543 0.005 -0.010 -0.010 0.225* 0.008 -0.014 0.011 -0.011 0.005 -0.001 -0.076 0.208 -0.081**
Self-emp × 1998 0.179 -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 0.085 0.023 -0.017 0.002 -0.009 0.001 -0.010 -0.047 0.039 -0.014
Self-emp × 1999 0.252 -0.002 -0.008 -0.010 0.181 0.001 0.006 0.009 -0.018* 0.002 -0.015 -0.071 -0.055 0.032**
Self-emp × 2000 0.507 0.001 -0.012 -0.024** 0.102 0.002 -0.008 0.015 -0.009 0.000 -0.015 -0.062 -0.082 0.314**
Self-emp × 2001 0.371 0.002 0.000 -0.009 0.031 -0.006 0.002 0.009 -0.010 0.004 -0.015 -0.044 -0.422** 0.491**
Self-emp × 2002 0.494 -0.005 0.012 -0.001 -0.166 -0.022 -0.004 0.034* -0.008 -0.000 -0.011 -0.040 -0.314 0.650**
Self-emp × 2003 0.562 0.005 -0.002 0.000 -0.107 -0.006 -0.006 0.017 -0.007 0.003 -0.030 -0.073 -0.185 0.741**
Self-emp × 2004 0.209 -0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.145 -0.016 0.000 0.016 -0.005 0.004 -0.039* -0.128** -0.459** 0.759**
Self-emp × 2005 0.556 -0.010 0.006 0.001 -0.010 -0.013 0.008 0.008 -0.006 0.003 -0.039* -0.114** 0.080 0.719**
Years of  Number of Adjusted
+ After-tax
++
Covariate Age White Black Hispanic schooling Excellent Very good Good Fair Poor Married children family income price of HI
Self-emp × 1996 -0.769* -0.010 0.000 -0.006 0.175 0.037 -0.008 -0.039* 0.003 0.008 -0.016 0.043 0.346 -0.008
Self-emp × 1997 -0.135 -0.017 0.002 -0.008 0.048 0.027 -0.010 -0.019 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.030 0.185 -0.073**
Self-emp × 1998 -0.012 -0.015 0.009 -0.000 0.219 0.053* -0.033 -0.031 0.012 -0.001 0.004 -0.007 0.351 -0.005
Self-emp × 1999 -0.144 -0.029* 0.023 -0.005 0.014 0.022 0.006 -0.025 -0.007 0.004 0.026 -0.017 0.054 0.037*
Self-emp × 2000 0.332 -0.020 0.003 -0.014 0.017 0.005 -0.016 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.019 -0.082 0.440* 0.345**
Self-emp × 2001 -0.223 -0.027* 0.016 -0.002 0.072 0.026 -0.029 -0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.007 -0.019 -0.013 0.475**
Self-emp × 2002 -0.123 -0.030* 0.009 -0.002 -0.023 0.009 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.017 -0.062 0.661**
Self-emp × 2003 -0.137 -0.037** 0.022* -0.000 0.033 0.004 -0.016 -0.013 0.020* 0.005 -0.014 -0.032 -0.258 0.774**
Self-emp × 2004 -0.393 -0.029* 0.020* -0.004 0.143 0.050* -0.026 -0.023 -0.006 0.005 -0.022 -0.020 -0.089 0.723**
Self-emp × 2005 -0.474 -0.032* 0.006 0.003 0.048 0.032 -0.001 -0.028 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.024 -0.138 0.714**
construction of the after-tax health insurance premiums.  * Significance at 5%. ** Significance at 1%.  
Notes: All models are based on weighted and clustered data and they include a constant term, self-employed indicator, and year effects.  Excluded categories are year 1995 and its
interaction with the self-employed indicator.  
+ Family income is adjusted for the household size and expressed in constant 2006 US$.  
++ See Section 4 for the details on the
Health status
Table 3: Difference-in-difference for selected covariates, men and women
MEN  (N=377,454)
WOMEN  (N=348,203)
Health statusMean St. Error Mean St. Error
Individual characteristics
Age 40.731 0.023 43.785 0.073
 Age 25-34 0.307 0.001 0.189 0.003
Age 35-44 0.330 0.001 0.330 0.004
Age 45-54 0.264 0.001 0.329 0.004
Age 55-60 0.098 0.001 0.153 0.003
Race/Ethnicity
White 0.841 0.001 0.890 0.002
Black 0.102 0.001 0.054 0.002
Hispanic 0.127 0.001 0.092 0.002
Education
Years of schooling 13.499 0.007 13.439 0.023
Less than high school 0.101 0.001 0.108 0.002
High school degree 0.323 0.001 0.354 0.004
Some college degree 0.261 0.001 0.251 0.003
Bachelor's degree 0.207 0.001 0.179 0.003
Graduate degree 0.107 0.001 0.108 0.002
Weekly hours worked
1-20 0.017 0.000 0.052 0.002
21-35 0.047 0.000 0.122 0.002
36-55 0.839 0.001 0.625 0.004
55+ 0.097 0.001 0.200 0.003
Health status
Excellent 0.350 0.001 0.338 0.003
Very good 0.367 0.001 0.361 0.003
Good 0.234 0.001 0.242 0.003
Fair 0.043 0.000 0.050 0.002
Poor 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.001
Health insurance
Any 0.831 0.001 0.658 0.004
Policy holder 0.719 0.001 0.392 0.004
Family characteristics
Married 0.669 0.001 0.709 0.004
Number of children under age 18 0.826 0.003 0.852 0.009
No children 0.563 0.001 0.565 0.004
One child 0.171 0.001 0.166 0.003
More than one child 0.266 0.001 0.269 0.003
Adjusted family income ($10,000)
+ 4.825 0.010 4.399 0.036
Estimated marginal tax rate (MTR)*
MTR = 0 0.053 0.000 0.127 0.002
0  <  MTR   ≤  10 0.035 0.000 0.051 0.002
10  <  MTR   ≤  15 0.426 0.001 0.402 0.003
15  <  MTR   ≤  28 0.362 0.001 0.284 0.003
MTR   >  28 0.124 0.001 0.135 0.002
Spouse characteristics
†
Spouse has any health insurance (HI) coverage 0.892 0.001 0.778 0.004
Spouse is HI policy holder 0.391 0.001 0.503 0.004
Spouse is policy holder of an emp.-provided HI 0.371 0.001 0.423 0.004
N
conditional on being married.  
Table 4a: Descriptive statistics, men
346,513 30,941
Self-employed Wage/salary
Notes: Means and standard errors are based on weighted and clustered data.  
+ Family income is adjusted for the household size
and expressed in constant 2006 US$.  * MTR are estimated using the TAXSIM program.  † Means for spouse characteristics areMean St. Error Mean St. Error
Individual characteristics
Age 41.021 0.024 43.108 0.090
 Age 25-34 0.296 0.001 0.203 0.004
Age 35-44 0.327 0.001 0.351 0.005
Age 45-54 0.277 0.001 0.313 0.004
Age 55-60 0.100 0.001 0.133 0.003
Race/Ethnicity
White 0.811 0.001 0.881 0.003
Black 0.134 0.001 0.059 0.002
Hispanic 0.100 0.001 0.072 0.002
Education
Years of schooling 13.652 0.006 13.759 0.025
Less than high school 0.071 0.001 0.067 0.002
High school degree 0.317 0.001 0.301 0.004
Some college degree 0.299 0.001 0.316 0.005
Bachelor's degree 0.213 0.001 0.210 0.004
Graduate degree 0.099 0.001 0.106 0.003
Weekly hours worked
1-20 0.090 0.001 0.258 0.004
21-35 0.155 0.001 0.212 0.004
36-55 0.722 0.001 0.430 0.005
55+ 0.033 0.000 0.100 0.003
Health status
Excellent 0.325 0.001 0.365 0.004
Very good 0.369 0.001 0.354 0.004
Good 0.249 0.001 0.223 0.004
Fair 0.051 0.000 0.048 0.002
Poor 0.007 0.000 0.009 0.001
Health insurance
Any 0.865 0.001 0.758 0.004
Policy holder 0.602 0.001 0.269 0.004
Family characteristics
Married 0.626 0.001 0.746 0.004
Number of children under age 18 0.850 0.003 0.987 0.011
No children 0.529 0.001 0.498 0.005
One child 0.204 0.001 0.177 0.003
More than one child 0.267 0.001 0.324 0.004
Adjusted family income ($10,000)
+ 4.588 0.010 4.607 0.045
Estimated marginal tax rate (MTR)*
MTR = 0 0.092 0.001 0.143 0.003
0  ≤  MTR   ≤  10 0.036 0.000 0.045 0.002
0  ≤  MTR   ≤  15 0.424 0.001 0.398 0.004
0  ≤  MTR   ≤  28 0.345 0.001 0.280 0.004
MTR   >  28 0.102 0.001 0.134 0.003
Spouse characteristics
†
Spouse has any health insurance (HI) coverage 0.913 0.001 0.860 0.004
Spouse is HI policy holder 0.670 0.001 0.752 0.005
Spouse is policy holder of an emp.-provided HI 0.636 0.001 0.622 0.005
N
conditional on being married.  
and expressed in constant 2006 US$.  * MTR are estimated using the TAXSIM program.  † Means for spouse characteristics are
Table 4b: Descriptive statistics, women
327,951 20,252
Self-employed Wage/salary
Notes: Means and standard errors are based on weighted and clustered data.  
+ Family income is adjusted for the household sizeWage/salary Self-employed Difference in
All men Wage/salary Self-employed Difference (t+1 - t) Difference (t+1 - t) Difference
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5) - (4)
1995 0.707 0.730 0.411 - - -
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013)
1996 0.706 0.727 0.422 -0.002 0.011 0.013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.005) (0.018) (0.019)
1997 0.699 0.727 0.397 -0.002 -0.014 -0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.017) (0.018)
1998 0.710 0.737 0.414 0.007 0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005) (0.017) (0.018)
1999 0.714 0.740 0.410 0.011* -0.002 -0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005) (0.017) (0.018)
2000 0.712 0.738 0.407 0.009 -0.004 -0.013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018)
2001 0.701 0.725 0.410 -0.005 -0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017)
2002 0.685 0.712 0.376 -0.017** -0.035* -0.018
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017)
2003 0.675 0.700 0.383 -0.030** -0.029 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017)
2004 0.662 0.690 0.353 -0.040** -0.058** -0.018
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017)
2005 0.659 0.686 0.343 -0.043** -0.069** -0.025
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.016) (0.016)
All years 0.693 0.719 0.392
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
N 377,454 346,513 30,941
Notes: Means (standard errors) are based on weighted and clustered data.  Components may not add to totals due to rounding.  * Significance at 5%.
Table 5a: Proportion of health insurance policy holders, men
** Significance at 1%.Wage/salary Self-employed Difference in
All women Wage/salary Self-employed Difference (t+1 - t) Difference (t+1 - t) Difference
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5) - (4)
1995 0.587 0.604 0.281 - - -
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014)
1996 0.590 0.605 0.277 0.001 -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.020) (0.021)
1997 0.585 0.605 0.263 0.001 -0.018 -0.019
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.019) (0.020)
1998 0.585 0.604 0.281 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.019) (0.020)
1999 0.580 0.598 0.279 -0.006 -0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.020) (0.020)
2000 0.588 0.608 0.267 0.004 -0.014 -0.018
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.019) (0.020)
2001 0.589 0.607 0.272 0.003 -0.008 -0.011
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018)
2002 0.581 0.600 0.260 -0.004 -0.021 -0.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018)
2003 0.581 0.599 0.272 -0.005 -0.009 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.019)
2004 0.580 0.598 0.282 -0.006 0.002 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005) (0.018) (0.019)
2005 0.571 0.591 0.230 -0.013** -0.051** -0.038*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.017) (0.018)
All years 0.583 0.602 0.269
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
N 348,203 327,951 20,252
Notes: Means (standard errors) are based on weighted and clustered data.  Components may not add to totals due to rounding.  * Significance at 5%.
Table 5b: Proportion of health insurance policy holders, women
** Significance at 1%.Married men Eligible men
Variable All men Single men Married men without kids Eligible men without kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-employed -0.326** -0.260** -0.355** -0.375** -0.275** -0.260**
(0.013) (0.025) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.021)
1996 -0.002 0.006 -0.007 -0.010 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
1997 -0.005 0.010 -0.013* -0.014 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
1998 -0.000 0.014 -0.007 -0.009 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
1999 0.002 0.019* -0.007 -0.013 0.007 0.005
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2000 -0.002 0.026** -0.014** -0.020* 0.006 0.007
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2001 -0.015** 0.008 -0.025** -0.031** -0.008 -0.008
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
2002 -0.026** -0.016* -0.029** -0.040** -0.017** -0.023**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2003 -0.038** -0.024** -0.043** -0.046** -0.028** -0.030**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2004 -0.046** -0.029** -0.052** -0.064** -0.034** -0.036**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2005 -0.048** -0.032** -0.054** -0.069** -0.037** -0.042**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Self-emp × 1996 0.005 -0.007 0.011 0.053 -0.007 -0.003
(0.017) (0.033) (0.019) (0.030) (0.020) (0.028)
Self-emp × 1997 -0.022 -0.038 -0.015 0.015 -0.018 -0.015
(0.017) (0.033) (0.020) (0.031) (0.020) (0.027)
Self-emp × 1998 -0.011 -0.028 -0.002 0.021 -0.013 -0.015
(0.017) (0.033) (0.020) (0.031) (0.020) (0.027)
Self-emp × 1999 -0.020 -0.043 -0.008 0.034 -0.022 -0.022
(0.017) (0.033) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020) (0.027)
Self-emp × 2000 -0.022 -0.055 -0.009 0.009 -0.028 -0.046
(0.017) (0.034) (0.020) (0.032) (0.021) (0.028)
Self-emp × 2001 0.002 0.007 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 -0.013
(0.016) (0.032) (0.019) (0.031) (0.019) (0.027)
Self-emp × 2002 -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 0.002 -0.039* -0.045
(0.016) (0.031) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.027)
Self-emp × 2003 0.001 -0.035 0.013 0.037 -0.022 -0.037
(0.016) (0.031) (0.019) (0.031) (0.019) (0.027)
Self-emp × 2004 -0.014 -0.043 -0.004 0.047 -0.025 -0.027
(0.016) (0.031) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.026)
Self-emp × 2005 -0.030 -0.061* -0.022 -0.005 -0.053** -0.068**
(0.016) (0.031) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.026)
Joint significance (p-values)
Year dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Interaction terms 0.288 0.272 0.652 0.419 0.093 0.178
Year DVs & interactions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R
2 0.124 0.149 0.116 0.106 0.179 0.157
N 377,454 108,132 269,322 95,292 307,777 160,749
Table 6a: Difference-in-difference regression results, men
Notes: All models include individual and family characteristics, a constant term, and state effects. For full regression results, see Appendix
Table 1a.   Excluded categories are non-Hispanic whites, less than high school degree, no children, year 1995, and its interaction with the
self-employed indicator.   Standard errors are in parantheses.  * Significance at 5%. ** Significance at 1%.Married women Eligible women
Variable All women Single women Married women without kids Eligible women without kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-employed -0.302** -0.241** -0.322** -0.320** -0.323** -0.281**
(0.013) (0.030) (0.015) (0.026) (0.021) (0.029)
1996 -0.001 0.009 -0.008 -0.012 0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
1997 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.017 -0.007 -0.014*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
1998 -0.010* -0.004 -0.012 -0.025** -0.010* -0.018**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
1999 -0.017** 0.006 -0.030** -0.031** -0.008 -0.013*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2000 -0.011* 0.009 -0.021** -0.027** -0.006 -0.017**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006)
2001 -0.014** -0.002 -0.022** -0.038** -0.010* -0.021**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2002 -0.023** -0.013 -0.029** -0.038** -0.022** -0.031**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2003 -0.027** -0.024** -0.027** -0.035** -0.032** -0.038**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2004 -0.029** -0.023** -0.030** -0.042** -0.032** -0.039**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2005 -0.039** -0.043** -0.035** -0.046** -0.044** -0.051**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Self-emp × 1996 -0.010 -0.048 0.006 -0.011 0.001 -0.028
(0.019) (0.040) (0.021) (0.037) (0.030) (0.041)
Self-emp × 1997 -0.024 -0.052 -0.016 -0.010 -0.048 -0.047
(0.018) (0.040) (0.021) (0.035) (0.029) (0.039)
Self-emp × 1998 -0.006 -0.025 0.002 0.001 -0.019 -0.029
(0.018) (0.041) (0.020) (0.035) (0.029) (0.038)
Self-emp × 1999 0.008 -0.018 0.025 0.013 0.004 0.008
(0.019) (0.043) (0.021) (0.035) (0.029) (0.040)
Self-emp × 2000 -0.022 -0.053 -0.007 -0.006 -0.033 -0.034
(0.019) (0.042) (0.021) (0.035) (0.030) (0.040)
Self-emp × 2001 -0.016 -0.044 -0.004 -0.020 -0.033 -0.060
(0.017) (0.038) (0.019) (0.033) (0.027) (0.037)
Self-emp × 2002 -0.014 -0.076* 0.009 0.005 -0.033 -0.049
(0.017) (0.038) (0.019) (0.034) (0.027) (0.038)
Self-emp × 2003 -0.007 -0.069 0.018 0.005 -0.039 -0.075*
(0.018) (0.038) (0.020) (0.034) (0.027) (0.037)
Self-emp × 2004 0.000 -0.021 0.009 -0.014 -0.006 -0.033
(0.018) (0.038) (0.019) (0.034) (0.027) (0.037)
Self-emp × 2005 -0.038* -0.065 -0.030 -0.080* -0.046 -0.094*
(0.017) (0.038) (0.019) (0.032) (0.027) (0.038)
Joint significance (p-values)
Year dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Interaction terms 0.227 0.577 0.142 0.112 0.373 0.195
Year DVs & interactions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R
2 0.120 0.161 0.074 0.056 0.130 0.097
N 348,203 122,196 226,007 89,356 236,374 127,934
Table 6b: Difference-in-difference regression results, women
Notes: All models include individual and family characteristics, a constant term, and state effects. For full regression results, see Appendix
Table 1b.   Excluded categories are non-Hispanic whites, less than high school degree, no children, year 1995, and its interaction with the
self-employed indicator.   Standard errors are in parantheses.  * Significance at 5%. ** Significance at 1%. Married men Eligible men
MEN All men Single men Married men without kids Eligible men without kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(M1)  Health insurance/Policy holder (LPM)
Coefficient -0.107** -0.228** -0.050** -0.085** -0.142** -0.204**
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010)
Semi-elasticity -0.316 -0.688 -0.147 -0.250 -0.415 -0.597
(M2)  Health insurance/Policy holder (Probit)
Coefficient -0.301** -0.640** -0.135** -0.218** -0.363** -0.540**
(0.018) (0.039) (0.021) (0.036) (0.023) (0.033)
Marginal effect -0.095** -0.205** -0.042** -0.067** -0.094** -0.149**
Semi-elasticity -0.281 -0.618 -0.123 -0.197 -0.275 -0.436
(M3)  Health insurance/Gruber & Poterba measure (LPM)
Coefficient -0.147** -0.224** -0.097** -0.164** -0.148** -0.207**
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
Semi-elasticity -0.434 -0.676 -0.285 -0.483 -0.433 -0.606
N 377,454 108,132 269,322 95,292 307,777 160,749
Married women Eligible women
WOMEN All women Single women Married women without kids Eligible women without kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(W1)  Health insurance/Policy holder (LPM)
Coefficient -0.136** -0.321** -0.024** -0.047** -0.238** -0.245**
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
Semi-elasticity -0.404 -1.005 -0.070 -0.138 -0.710 -0.726
(W2)  Health insurance/Policy holder (Probit)
Coefficient -0.443** -0.900** -0.082** -0.147** -0.684** -0.683**
(0.024) (0.055) (0.028) (0.043) (0.033) (0.045)
Marginal effect -0.156** -0.269** -0.031** -0.055** -0.204** -0.191**
Semi-elasticity -0.464 -0.843 -0.091 -0.162 -0.609 -0.566
(W3)  Health insurance/Gruber & Poterba measure (LPM)
Coefficient -0.210** -0.304** -0.101** -0.145** -0.232** -0.223**
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013)
Semi-elasticity -0.625 -0.952 -0.295 -0.427 -0.692 -0.661
N 348,203 122,196 226,007 89,356 236,374 127,934
Notes: All models include individual and family characteristics, a constant term, and state effects. For full regression results, see Appendix Tables 2a and 2b.  Standard errors
Table 7: Estimates of insurance demand, men and women
are in parantheses.  * Significance at 5%.  ** Significance at 1%.Married men Eligible men
Variable All men Single men Married men without kids Eligible men without kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-employed -0.326** -0.260** -0.355** -0.375** -0.275** -0.260**
(0.013) (0.025) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.021)
1996 -0.002 0.006 -0.007 -0.010 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
1997 -0.005 0.010 -0.013* -0.014 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
1998 -0.000 0.014 -0.007 -0.009 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
1999 0.002 0.019* -0.007 -0.013 0.007 0.005
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2000 -0.002 0.026** -0.014** -0.020* 0.006 0.007
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2001 -0.015** 0.008 -0.025** -0.031** -0.008 -0.008
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
2002 -0.026** -0.016* -0.029** -0.040** -0.017** -0.023**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2003 -0.038** -0.024** -0.043** -0.046** -0.028** -0.030**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2004 -0.046** -0.029** -0.052** -0.064** -0.034** -0.036**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2005 -0.048** -0.032** -0.054** -0.069** -0.037** -0.042**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Self-emp × 1996 0.005 -0.007 0.011 0.053 -0.007 -0.003
(0.017) (0.033) (0.019) (0.030) (0.020) (0.028)
Self-emp × 1997 -0.022 -0.038 -0.015 0.015 -0.018 -0.015
(0.017) (0.033) (0.020) (0.031) (0.020) (0.027)
Self-emp × 1998 -0.011 -0.028 -0.002 0.021 -0.013 -0.015
(0.017) (0.033) (0.020) (0.031) (0.020) (0.027)
Self-emp × 1999 -0.020 -0.043 -0.008 0.034 -0.022 -0.022
(0.017) (0.033) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020) (0.027)
Self-emp × 2000 -0.022 -0.055 -0.009 0.009 -0.028 -0.046
(0.017) (0.034) (0.020) (0.032) (0.021) (0.028)
Self-emp × 2001 0.002 0.007 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 -0.013
(0.016) (0.032) (0.019) (0.031) (0.019) (0.027)
Self-emp × 2002 -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 0.002 -0.039* -0.045
(0.016) (0.031) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.027)
Self-emp × 2003 0.001 -0.035 0.013 0.037 -0.022 -0.037
(0.016) (0.031) (0.019) (0.031) (0.019) (0.027)
Self-emp × 2004 -0.014 -0.043 -0.004 0.047 -0.025 -0.027
(0.016) (0.031) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.026)
Self-emp × 2005 -0.030 -0.061* -0.022 -0.005 -0.053** -0.068**
(0.016) (0.031) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.026)
Age 0.012** 0.016** 0.008** 0.001 0.017** 0.013**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared/100 -0.010** -0.013** -0.005** 0.003 -0.016** -0.011**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Black -0.067** -0.063** -0.062** -0.049** -0.064** -0.059**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Hispanic -0.127** -0.124** -0.130** -0.137** -0.142** -0.126**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Appendix Table 1a: Full set of estimation results for the difference-in-difference regression model, menMarried men Eligible men
Variable All men Single men Married men without kids Eligible men without kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High school degree 0.165** 0.174** 0.160** 0.144** 0.179** 0.157**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Some college degree 0.222** 0.253** 0.204** 0.175** 0.245** 0.221**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Bachelor's degree 0.267** 0.329** 0.236** 0.195** 0.290** 0.281**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Graduate degree 0.277** 0.343** 0.254** 0.214** 0.282** 0.275**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Married 0.009** - - - 0.104** 0.091**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Adjusted family income 0.008** 0.016** 0.005** 0.005** 0.011** 0.010**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
One child -0.000 0.005 0.001 - 0.012** -
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
More than one child 0.017** -0.020* 0.018** - 0.007** -
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.201** 0.047 0.275** 0.494** 0.065** 0.064*
(0.020) (0.034) (0.027) (0.039) (0.020) (0.026)
Joint significance (p-values)
Year dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Interaction terms 0.288 0.272 0.652 0.419 0.093 0.178
Year DVs & interactions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R
2 0.124 0.149 0.116 0.106 0.179 0.157
N 377,454 108,132 269,322 95,292 307,777 160,749
US$10,000.  Standard errors are in parantheses.  * Significance at 5%. ** Significance at 1%.
self-employed indicator.  All models include state effects which are not reported here.  Adjusted family income is in constant 2006
Appendix Table 1a: Full set of estimation results for the difference-in-difference regression model, men (continued)
Notes: Excluded categories are non-Hispanic whites, less than high school degree, no children, year 1995, and its interaction with the Married women Eligible women
Variable All women Single women Married women without kids Eligible women without kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-employed -0.302** -0.241** -0.322** -0.320** -0.323** -0.281**
(0.013) (0.030) (0.015) (0.026) (0.021) (0.029)
1996 -0.001 0.009 -0.008 -0.012 0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
1997 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.017 -0.007 -0.014*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
1998 -0.010* -0.004 -0.012 -0.025** -0.010* -0.018**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
1999 -0.017** 0.006 -0.030** -0.031** -0.008 -0.013*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2000 -0.011* 0.009 -0.021** -0.027** -0.006 -0.017**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006)
2001 -0.014** -0.002 -0.022** -0.038** -0.010* -0.021**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2002 -0.023** -0.013 -0.029** -0.038** -0.022** -0.031**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2003 -0.027** -0.024** -0.027** -0.035** -0.032** -0.038**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2004 -0.029** -0.023** -0.030** -0.042** -0.032** -0.039**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2005 -0.039** -0.043** -0.035** -0.046** -0.044** -0.051**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Self-emp × 1996 -0.010 -0.048 0.006 -0.011 0.001 -0.028
(0.019) (0.040) (0.021) (0.037) (0.030) (0.041)
Self-emp × 1997 -0.024 -0.052 -0.016 -0.010 -0.048 -0.047
(0.018) (0.040) (0.021) (0.035) (0.029) (0.039)
Self-emp × 1998 -0.006 -0.025 0.002 0.001 -0.019 -0.029
(0.018) (0.041) (0.020) (0.035) (0.029) (0.038)
Self-emp × 1999 0.008 -0.018 0.025 0.013 0.004 0.008
(0.019) (0.043) (0.021) (0.035) (0.029) (0.040)
Self-emp × 2000 -0.022 -0.053 -0.007 -0.006 -0.033 -0.034
(0.019) (0.042) (0.021) (0.035) (0.030) (0.040)
Self-emp × 2001 -0.016 -0.044 -0.004 -0.020 -0.033 -0.060
(0.017) (0.038) (0.019) (0.033) (0.027) (0.037)
Self-emp × 2002 -0.014 -0.076* 0.009 0.005 -0.033 -0.049
(0.017) (0.038) (0.019) (0.034) (0.027) (0.038)
Self-emp × 2003 -0.007 -0.069 0.018 0.005 -0.039 -0.075*
(0.018) (0.038) (0.020) (0.034) (0.027) (0.037)
Self-emp × 2004 0.000 -0.021 0.009 -0.014 -0.006 -0.033
(0.018) (0.038) (0.019) (0.034) (0.027) (0.037)
Self-emp × 2005 -0.038* -0.065 -0.030 -0.080* -0.046 -0.094*
(0.017) (0.038) (0.019) (0.032) (0.027) (0.038)
Age 0.008** 0.016** -0.000 -0.006** 0.017** 0.012**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared/100 -0.006** -0.012** 0.001 0.007** -0.016** -0.010**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Black 0.014** -0.027** 0.066** 0.050** -0.031** -0.029**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Hispanic -0.046** -0.084** -0.028** -0.058** -0.091** -0.092**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Appendix Table 1b: Full set of estimation results for the difference-in-difference regression model, womenMarried women Eligible women
Variable All women Single women Married women without kids Eligible women without kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High school degree 0.153** 0.208** 0.107** 0.087** 0.198** 0.168**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Some college degree 0.208** 0.284** 0.147** 0.132** 0.271** 0.230**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Bachelor's degree 0.272** 0.359** 0.204** 0.185** 0.338** 0.292**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007)
Graduate degree 0.334** 0.371** 0.287** 0.271** 0.364** 0.323**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007)
Married -0.179** - - - -0.002 -0.033**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Adjusted family income 0.006** 0.022** 0.003** 0.001** 0.012** 0.010**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
One child -0.065** -0.034** -0.075** - -0.019** -
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
More than one child -0.137** -0.098** -0.151** - -0.070** -
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.281** 0.031 0.464** 0.572** 0.017 0.166**
(0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.046) (0.023) (0.029)
Joint significance (p-values)
Year dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Interaction terms 0.227 0.577 0.142 0.112 0.373 0.195
Year DVs & interactions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R
2 0.120 0.161 0.074 0.056 0.130 0.097
N 348,203 122,196 226,007 89,356 236,374 127,934
US$10,000.  Standard errors are in parantheses.  * Significance at 5%. ** Significance at 1%.
self-employed indicator.  All models include state effects which are not reported here.  Adjusted family income is in constant 2006
Appendix Table 1b: Full set of estimation results for the difference-in-difference regression model, women (continued)
Notes: Excluded categories are non-Hispanic whites, less than high school degree, no children, year 1995, and its interaction with the Married men Eligible men
Variable Single men Married men without kids Eligible men without kids
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-employed -0.338** -0.074** 0.284** -0.239** -0.145** 0.050** 0.213**
(0.004) (0.015) (0.029) (0.018) (0.032) (0.018) (0.026)
1996 -0.002 -0.002 0.005 -0.007 -0.006 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
1997 -0.007 -0.011* -0.001 -0.016** -0.016* -0.004 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
1998 -0.001 0.002 0.018* -0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
1999 0.001 0.006 0.028** -0.005 -0.005 0.013** 0.014*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2000 -0.003 0.006 0.041** -0.011* -0.012 0.016** 0.020**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2001 -0.014** 0.001 0.041** -0.018** -0.018* 0.012** 0.019**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
2002 -0.026** -0.005 0.029** -0.021** -0.023** 0.007 0.013*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2003 -0.038** -0.011** 0.028** -0.029** -0.022** 0.004 0.015*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2004 -0.047** -0.016** 0.034** -0.038** -0.035** 0.003 0.018**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
2005 -0.050** -0.021** 0.026** -0.042** -0.045** -0.003 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Age 0.012** 0.012** 0.015** 0.007** 0.001 0.016** 0.013**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared/100 -0.010** -0.010** -0.012** -0.005** 0.003 -0.015** -0.010**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Black -0.067** -0.066** -0.061** -0.062** -0.048** -0.063** -0.058**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Hispanic -0.127** -0.126** -0.123** -0.130** -0.136** -0.141** -0.125**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
High school degree 0.165** 0.163** 0.171** 0.159** 0.143** 0.177** 0.155**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Some college degree 0.222** 0.220** 0.248** 0.204** 0.173** 0.243** 0.217**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Bachelor's degree 0.267** 0.264** 0.323** 0.235** 0.193** 0.287** 0.276**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Graduate degree 0.277** 0.274** 0.335** 0.253** 0.212** 0.278** 0.269**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Married 0.009** 0.009** - - - 0.103** 0.091**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Adjusted family income 0.008** 0.007** 0.014** 0.005** 0.005** 0.010** 0.009**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
One child -0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.000 - 0.011** -
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
More than one child 0.017** 0.015** -0.015 0.017** - 0.005* -
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
After-tax HI premium - -0.107** -0.228** -0.050** -0.085** -0.142** -0.204**
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010)
Constant 0.202** 0.250** 0.143** 0.297** 0.525** 0.126** 0.143**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.034) (0.027) (0.039) (0.020) (0.027)
R
2 0.124 0.125 0.155 0.116 0.107 0.181 0.161
N 377,454 377,454 108,132 269,322 95,292 307,777 160,749
After-tax HI premium is in constant 2006 US$1,000.  Standard errors are in parantheses.  * Significance at 5%. ** Significance at 1%.
Appendix Table 2a: Full set of estimation results for the health insurance demand regression (LPM), men
employed indicator.  All models include state effects which are not reported here.  Adjusted family income is in constant 2006 US$10,000.
Notes: Excluded categories are non-Hispanic whites, less than high school degree, no children, year 1995, and its interaction with the self-
All menMarried women Eligible women
Variable Single women Married women without kids Eligible women without kids
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-employed -0.314** 0.021 0.545** -0.262** -0.215** 0.241** 0.284**
(0.004) (0.018) (0.037) (0.020) (0.036) (0.025) (0.035)
1996 -0.002 -0.001 0.007 -0.008 -0.013 0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
1997 -0.006 -0.010* -0.014* -0.008 -0.019* -0.017** -0.024**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
1998 -0.010* -0.006 0.005 -0.011 -0.024** -0.004 -0.013*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
1999 -0.016** -0.009 0.025** -0.027** -0.028** 0.005 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2000 -0.012* -0.000 0.034** -0.019** -0.023* 0.012* -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2001 -0.015** 0.004 0.041** -0.019** -0.033** 0.020** 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2002 -0.024** 0.001 0.044** -0.024** -0.029** 0.020** 0.011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
2003 -0.027** 0.005 0.048** -0.020** -0.024* 0.020** 0.013
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
2004 -0.029** 0.008 0.063** -0.023** -0.030** 0.030** 0.023**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007)
2005 -0.041** -0.005 0.040** -0.031** -0.039** 0.015** 0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007)
Age 0.008** 0.007** 0.014** -0.000 -0.006** 0.016** 0.011**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared/100 -0.006** -0.006** -0.011** 0.001 0.007** -0.015** -0.009**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Black 0.014** 0.014** -0.026** 0.066** 0.050** -0.030** -0.029**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Hispanic -0.046** -0.046** -0.082** -0.028** -0.057** -0.090** -0.091**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
High school degree 0.153** 0.151** 0.202** 0.107** 0.086** 0.195** 0.164**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Some college degree 0.208** 0.205** 0.275** 0.147** 0.131** 0.266** 0.225**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Bachelor's degree 0.272** 0.268** 0.346** 0.203** 0.184** 0.330** 0.284**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007)
Graduate degree 0.334** 0.330** 0.357** 0.287** 0.270** 0.356** 0.315**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007)
Married -0.179** -0.182** - - - -0.006* -0.033**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Adjusted family income 0.006** 0.005** 0.019** 0.003** 0.001* 0.010** 0.009**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
One child -0.065** -0.065** -0.031** -0.075** - -0.019** -
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
More than one child -0.137** -0.138** -0.088** -0.152** - -0.069** -
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
After-tax HI premium - -0.136** -0.321** -0.024** -0.047** -0.238** -0.245**
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
Constant 0.282** 0.346** 0.185** 0.475** 0.591** 0.131** 0.268**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.046) (0.024) (0.030)
R
2 0.119 0.121 0.169 0.073 0.056 0.134 0.101
N 348,203 348,203 122,196 226,007 89,356 236,374 127,934
After-tax HI premium is in constant 2006 US$1,000.  Standard errors are in parantheses.  * Significance at 5%. ** Significance at 1%.
Appendix Table 2b: Full set of estimation results for the health insurance demand regression (LPM), women
employed indicator.  All models include state effects which are not reported here.  Adjusted family income is in constant 2006 US$10,000.
Notes: Excluded categories are non-Hispanic whites, less than high school degree, no children, year 1995, and its interaction with the self-
All women